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PRIVACY HARM EXCEPTIONALISM 
 
RYAN CALO 
“Exceptionalism” refers to the belief that a person, place, or thing is 
qualitatively different from others in the same basic category. Thus, 
some have spoken of America’s exceptionalism as a nation.1 Early 
debates about the Internet focused on the prospect that existing laws and 
institutions would prove inadequate to govern the new medium of 
cyberspace. Scholars have made similar claims about other areas of law. 
The focus of this short essay is the supposed exceptionalism of 
privacy. Rather than catalogue all the ways that privacy might differ 
from other concepts or areas of study, I intend to focus on the narrow but 
important issue of harm. I will argue that courts and some scholars 
require a showing of harm in privacy out of proportion with other areas 
of law. Many also assume, counterintuitively, that the information 
industry somehow differs from virtually every other industry in 
generating no real externalities. 
I. 
Harm is a prerequisite to recovery in many contexts. For a plaintiff 
to recover in tort, for instance, she must almost always show damage of 
some kind. Many statutes require injury as an element.2 For the Federal 
Trade Commission to bring an action under its authority to protect 
consumers from unfair practice, the practice at issue must “cause or [be] 
likely to cause substantial injury to consumers.”3 
But harm presents an especially acute challenge in the context of 
privacy. Courts generally demand that privacy plaintiffs show not just 
harm, but concrete, fundamental, or “special” harm before they can 
recover.4 Take the case of Doe v. Chao, in which the Supreme Court 
 
1.  See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED 
SWORD 18 (W. W. Norton & Co. 1996) (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA 51 (Knopf 1948) (referring to America as “qualitatively” different from other 
nations)).  
2.  E.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008). 
3.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006).  
4.  See Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 257 (D. Conn. 2008) (requiring privacy 
harm to be “special” in order to proceed anonymously); see also Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(g)(4)(a) (2010); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(d); Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614 (2003); Fed. 
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confronted the question of whether the Privacy Act of 1974 requires a 
plaintiff to show “actual damages” before recovery.5 The Court held that 
the plaintiffs, whose social security numbers the government had sent to 
various unauthorized parties, had to show that the technical violation of 
the Act actually harmed them.6 They were not able to do so and the Court 
dismissed the case. 
This was a strange way to read the plain text. Where, as stipulated 
in Chao, the United States violates the relevant provisions of the statute, 
the Privacy Act says that “the United States shall be liable to the 
individual in an amount equal to the sum of actual damages sustained by 
the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a 
person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000.”7 The 
natural way to read this language is that anyone whose data is released in 
contravention of the Act receives up to the actual damages that resulted, 
but at least $1,000. 
In fairness, the Privacy Act also requires that the government’s 
failure to comply with the Act must occur “in such a way as to have an 
adverse effect on an individual” to qualify for civil remedy.8 Maybe the 
social security numbers in Chao had no such effect. But Chao was not 
the last word on harm in the context of the Privacy Act. 
In 2012, the Supreme Court decided Federal Aviation 
Administration v. Cooper.9 At issue was whether a licensed pilot named 
Stanmore Cooper could sue the Social Security Administration for 
disclosing his human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) status to the Federal 
Aviation Administration in contravention of the Privacy Act. The 
consequence was “adverse,” to put too mildly: Cooper lost his job and 
was charged criminally. Nevertheless, and while acknowledging that the 
term “actual damages” “is sometimes understood to include non-
pecuniary harm,” the Cooper Court adopted “an interpretation of ‘actual 
damages’ limited to pecuniary or economic harm.”10 
Let me summarize the state of the law around the Privacy Act: A 
person who was abjectly humiliated by the widespread release of highly 
personal information by the government would be entitled to no 
 
Aviation Admin. v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1441, 1441 (2012). 
5.  Doe, 540 U.S. at 614. 
6.  Id. 
7.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(a). 
8.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(d).  
9.  Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1441. 
10.  Id. at 1453. In Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit dismissed a similar 
claim in which the plaintiff, a police officer, lamented an “investigation” into whether his 
religious views affected his policing duties. The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing 
because any perceived harm did not amount to a “substantial” injury. 27 F.3d 1385, 1388-89, 
1395 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1000 (1994). 
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compensation under Chao or Cooper. Whereas a person who suffered 
one dollar in damages due to a minor violation would recover a thousand 
dollars.11 
A high threshold for privacy harm is not limited to the Supreme 
Court, or to courts in general. Legal scholars pose equally difficult 
challenges to their colleagues. A variety of scholars have made progress 
in theorizing and measuring privacy harm, lending the concept a 
structure and depth that meets or exceeds that of other subjective 
harms.12 But it never seems enough, as demonstrated by critiques ranging 
far across the ideological spectrum. Thus, for instance, libertarian Adam 
Thierer equates the search for privacy harm with the “quixotic” quest for 
harm to happiness.13 He concludes that without a showing of harm 
regulators should tread very lightly when it comes to information. 
Whereas feminist legal theorist Ann Bartow demands of Daniel Solove 
that his case for privacy harm furnish nothing short of “dead bodies” to 
establish the significance of the field.14 
II. 
The (impossibly) high bar that some jurists and scholars expect 
privacy harm to overcome is suspicious for a few reasons. First, privacy 
is only one of a wide variety of contexts in which the harm is in some 
sense “ethereal.”15 The tort of assault—where the harm is the emotion of 
fear—dates back six and a half centuries.16 Today a wide variety of torts, 
from loss of consortium to intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
compensate emotional harm.17 Obviously there are line-drawing 
problems: courts worry about fraud, idiosyncrasy, and the lack of a 
limiting principle. That is why the tort of assault requires imminence. 
But this concern is at least analytically distinct from the question of 
whether the category of harm the plaintiff experienced is compensable. 
 
11.  Can you think of a hypothetical, meanwhile, where a violation of the Privacy Act 
would result in concrete pecuniary harm of this variety? Recall that Mr. Cooper himself lost 
his pilots’ license and therefore his entire livelihood.  
12.  E.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011); 
Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the 
Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007); Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 
97 MINN. L. REV. 907 (2013). 
13.  Adam Thierer, The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is 
Failing, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 414–17 (2013). 
14.  Ann Bartow, A Feeling of Unease About Privacy Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 52, 52 
(2007). 
15.  Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 139 (1992). 
16.  I de S et Ux. v. W de S, Y.B. 22 Edw. 3, fol. 99, pl. 60 (1348). How the harm of 
unhappiness is any less quixotic than the harm of fear eludes me.  
17.  See Levit, supra note 15, at 140–58 (discussing examples). 
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Second, privacy harm exceptionalists disregard an option available 
to courts and regulators that care about privacy: they could simply 
assume harm upon a showing of violation. Because policymakers do 
assume harm sometimes. For instance, no showing of actual harm is 
necessary for the Federal Trade Commission to pursue a deceptive 
practice. We have decided that deceiving consumers is harmful in its 
own right. Moreover, some statutes set minimum damages precisely in 
order to sidestep the necessity of calculating the effect of a violation.18 I 
would argue that is exactly what Congress was up to with the Privacy 
Act, notwithstanding the Court’s interpretive calisthenics to the contrary. 
There is, finally, an even more basic and intuitive point to be made. 
In the history of the world, there has never been a multi-billion dollar 
industry that has not generated negative externalities: energy, finance, 
transportation, food, drugs, the list goes on. Every single one of them has 
imposed costs in the form of pollution, instability, physical injury, or side 
effects. No major human activity is without a downside. And yet, for 
some reason, quite a lot of people seem to hold the implicit belief that the 
online advertising or data broker industries are exceptional, rather than 
assume that the side-effect merely takes some time fully to materialize. 
Now that would be exceptional. 
III. 
The common law created four causes of action, the Congress wrote 
a statute, the FTC created a separate division, all for a reason. Yes, we 
should proceed cautiously in regulating information; I have argued so in 
the past.19 We need to be creative, as no single set of rules is likely to 
resolve the problems that information privacy generates. I am also wary 
of sweeping statements, like those famous words of Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis, that emotional and spiritual harm is somehow a higher 
priority than broken bones or ruined property.20 But the wise and proper 
reaction to the ongoing illusiveness of privacy harm is not to require 
victims or scholars to move theoretical or evidentiary mountains before 
they see recovery (and with it deterrence). Rather, the appropriate 
reaction is to roll up one’s sleeves and figure out the nature of this harm 
as we’ve done with some many others. 
 
 
18.  See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)–(2) (2010) (providing for minimum damages of 
$200 or $750 for copyright infringement depending on the awareness of the infringer).  
19.  M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (And Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012). 
20.  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
